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I.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

This court has jurisdiction of this appeal from a final order
granting summary judgment pursuant to Rule 3, subdivision (a) , Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure and Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a3(2)(k) (1987).
II.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

The primary issue is whether the trial court erred in ruling
as a matter of law that the plaintiff, Jose Ruiz, was not employed
in commerce at the time of his injury and was, therefore, not
entitled to the benefits of the Federal Employers' Liability Act
(FELA).
On appeal from summary judgment, an appellate court resolves
only legal issues. It determines whether the trial court erred in
applying governing law and whether the trial court correctly held
that no genuine issue of fact was in dispute.
County Comm'n, 834 P.2d 1 (Utah. 1992).

Weese v. Davis

When reviewing an order

granting summary judgment, the evidence and all inferences that may
be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be literally construed
in favor of the party opposing the motion.

Johnson v. Morton

Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997 (Utah 1991).
When reviewing an order concerning the rights and obligations
of parties in a Federal Employers' Liability Act case, the court is
bound by federal law interpreting the statute.

Chesapeake & Ohio

Rv. Co. v. Kuhn. 284 U.S. 44, 46-47, 76 L.Ed. 157, 160, 52 S.Ct. 45
(1931).
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The issues concerning employment and coverage by the statute
were raised by appellant

in his Memorandum

in Opposition to

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 243) , his Memorandum
of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment

(R. at 235) and his Memorandum of Points and

Authorities in Reply to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 395).
III.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTE

The applicable statute, codified as 45 U.S.C. section 51, is
reproduced verbatim in the addendum.

In relevant part, with

emphasis added, it provides that:
Every common carrier by railroad while
engaging in commerce between any of the
several states . . . shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while
he is employed bv such carrier in such
commerce . . . for such injury . . . resulting
in whole or in part from the negligence of any
of the officers, agents, or employees of such
carrier, or by reason of any defect or
insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its .
. track, roadbed, works . . . or other
equipment.
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose
duties as such employee shall be the
furtherance of interstate . . . commerce: or
shall, in any way directly or closely and
substantially, affect such commerce .
shall, for the purposes of this Act be
considered as being employed by such carrier
in such commerce and shall be considered as
entitled to the benefits of this Act . . . .

2

IV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings
and Dispositions Below
This action, brought pursuant to the provisions of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act and arising from injuries to plaintiff
Jose Ruiz on May 18, 1990, was filed on March 7, 1991 (R. at 1) .
Defendant Southern Pacific Transportation Company filed a motion
for summary

judgment

on January 22, 1993 on the basis that

"plaintiff was not within the scope of his employment at the time
he was injured." (R. at 164).

On November 5, 1993, before the

court ruled on defendant's motion, plaintiff filed a motion for
partial summary judgment on the scope of employment issue. (R. at
233) .
The court issued a ruling on January 11, 1994 which concluded
that, as a matter of law, plaintiff was not in the course of his
employment.

(R. at 429, see Addendum).

The order granting

defendant's motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's
motion for partial summary judgment was filed on January 22, 1994.
(R. at 436, see Addendum).
Plaintiff

filed a motion

for new trial with

memorandum on February 7, 1994.

(R. at 448).

supporting

The motion was

denied by order filed August 8, 1994. (R. at 548).

Notice of

appeal from both the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment and the Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial was
filed on August 31, 1994. (R. at 551). Plaintiff hereby abandons
his appeal from the order denying the new trial and will proceed
3

only as to the court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
defendant.
V.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Jurisdictional Basis

1.

Defendant Southern Pacific Transportation Company is a

common carrier by railroad employed in interstate commerce.

(R. at

7).
2.

Plaintiff Jose Ruiz was an employee of defendant at the

time of the accident.
3.

(R. at 7, 166, 287).

This is an action for personal injuries by a railroad

employee pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45
U.S.C. section 51 et seq.

(R. at 287).

Employment Status Prior to 5:00 a.m. on May 18, 1990
4.

Plaintiff was a maintenance of way worker assigned to

Extra Gang 11 working out of Montello, Nevada.

(R. at 252-53, 321-

22, 418).
5.

Extra Gang 11 was a trailer gang working between various

points and could be moved from Ogden, Utah to Sparks, Nevada.

(R.

at 252-53).
6.

Trailer gang members received extra pay for living in

trailers and moving to different locations.
7.

(R. at 255).

The collective bargaining agreement between plaintiff's

union and defendant governs rates of pay, hours of service and
working conditions for maintenance of way employees. (R. at 289-90,
335) .
8. Employees in trailer gangs are assigned to living quarters
4

owned and maintained by defendant, receive a meal expense, are
provided with bedding and bath supplies or in-lieu payment, receive
water and ice, may be designated as camp tenders and are expected
to maintain their quarters in a clean and sanitary condition.

(R.

at 370-72) .
Designated Assembly Point
9.

Plaintiff's

foreman

and

the

foreman's

supervisor

understood the "on-duty point" for Extra Gang 11 to be Montello,
Nevada.

(R. at 304, 381, 414).

10.

Under the collective bargaining agreement, employees'

time starts and ends at regular designated assembly points.

(R. at

352) .
11. When an employee's living quarters is a trailer furnished
by

defendant,

the

trailer

is established

as

the

employee's

headquarters. (R. at 353).
12.
point.

An employee's headquarters is the designated assembly
(R. at 353).

13.

Employees are not allowed time while traveling between

their homes and designated assembly points. (R. at 367).
14. Under the collective bargaining agreement, plaintiff was
entitled to be compensated starting at Montello on the day of his
accident.

(R. at 418-19).

15. Defendant provided transportation by truck for Extra Gang
11 members from Montello to its work sites. (R. at 167, 288, 304).
16.

On the day of the accident, when the crew was to fix

railroad tracks at Lakeside, Utah, pursuant to permission from his
5

foreman, plaintiff was allowed to drive his own vehicle to the work
site so that he could drive from there directly home to Ogden, Utah
for the weekend.

(R. at 167, 288, 431).

17. Extra Gang 11 members traveling in defendant's truck from
Montello to Lakeside on May 18, 1990 were considered to be on-duty
and were paid overtime from 5:00 a.m. until 7:00 a.m. for the twohour commute.
18.

(R. at 167, 260, 287, 293, 314).

Plaintiff's foreman told plaintiff that since he would

not be under defendant's supervision, he would not be compensated
for his time or reimbursed for the use of his vehicle or gas.

(R.

at 167).
19. Neither plaintiff's foreman nor the foreman's supervisor
were aware of any written policy or documents of defendant stating
that plaintiff would be considered off-duty for the trip from
Montello to Lakeside in his private vehicle.

(R. at 398-99, 412,

415-16).
20. Plaintiff's foreman testified by affidavit that plaintiff
understood he would not be compensated for the commute but that it
was worth giving up the pay to get home earlier. (R. at 167).
21.

Plaintiff has been adjudicated mentally incompetent,

functions at the level of a three year old, is not capable of
participating in a deposition and is unavailable as a witness. (R.
at 283-84).
22.

Plaintiff's foreman did not have authority under the

collective bargaining agreement to alter plaintiff's starting time
for purposes of compensation.

(R. at 418) .
6

23. At about 5:00 a.m. on May 18, 1990, plaintiff was dressed
for work and advised his foreman that he would be right behind the
truck and that they would meet at Lakeside. (R. at 311-13).
24.

Plaintiff was injured while driving his private vehicle

from Montello in a rollover accident approximately 14 miles from
the work site at Lakeside while on a private gravel road owned and
maintained by defendant which ran parallel to the railroad tracks.
(R. at 7, 166-68, 287, 395).
25.

Plaintiff's foreman was responsible to report the time

worked by plaintiff.

(R. at 289).

26. Plaintiff's foreman was of the opinion that plaintiff had
not yet reported for duty at the time of the accident and did not
log plaintiff as having performed any work on the day of the
accident.
27.
1990.

(R. at 168, 289).
Plaintiff was not compensated for his time on May 18,

(R. at 168).
28.

The collective bargaining agreement requires that all

claims or grievances be presented in writing within sixty days from
the date of the occurrence on which the claim or grievance is
based.
29.

(R. at 374).
Plaintiff suffered a severe injury to his head from the

automobile accident on May 18, 1990 but did not have a conservator
appointed until July 8, 1991.

(R. at 274, 282)
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VI.
1.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Applicability and scope of federal law to plaintiff's

employment status.
A.

The rights and obligations of the parties in a

Federal Employers' Liability Act case are controlled by federal
law.
B. The term "employed" as used in the Federal Employers'
Liability Act of 1908 was intended to describe the conventional
relationship of employer and employee.
C.

By amendment in 1939 Congress expanded the benefits

of the Federal Employers' Liability Act so as to avoid narrow
distinctions and to comprehensively expand coverage.
2.

Plaintiff's employment status prior to the accident
A. Plaintiff Jose Ruiz was covered

by the Federal

Employers' Liability Act before leaving his trailer headquarter on
the day of the accident.
B. Because plaintiff's trip from his headquarters to the
work site was a necessary incident of his employment, he was
covered by the act during the entirety of his trip prior to the
accident.
C.

Because plaintiff was on defendant's private road

leading to the actual work site, he was covered by the act during
at least that portion of his trip.
3.

The trial court's errors.
A.

Plaintiff's mode of travel did not remove him from

the act's coverage.
8

B.

Neither the willingness of plaintiff to forego pay

nor the understanding of his supervisor in that regard removed
plaintiff from the act's coverage and benefits.
C.

The trial court erred in not ruling as a matter of

law, against defendant's motion for summary judgment.
D.

At the very least, the trial court erred in not

ruling that there were material triable issues of fact.
VII.
1.

ARGUMENT

Federal law is determinative of the employment status of
plaintiff at the time of his injury.
A.

Supremacy of federal law

As enacted in 1908 the Federal Employers' Liability Act
issue would have been framed as whether plaintiff Jose Ruiz
suffered

injury while he was "employed" by the defendant in

interstate

commerce.

See

45 U.S. C.

§

51,

(paragraph

1,

Determinative Statute, supra) , Act April 22, 1908, ch. 149, § 1, 35
Stat. 65.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear from the
earliest days of the statute that "there are weighty considerations
why the controlling law should be uniform and not change at every
state line." New York Central R.R. Co. v. Winfield, 244, U.S. 147,
149,

61 L.Ed

1045,

1047-48,

37, S.Ct.

780

(1917).

restated the point some years later:
[I]n proceedings under that Act,
wherever brought, the rights and
obligations of the parties depend
upon it and applicable principles of
common law as interpreted and
applied in the Federal courts. . . .
That statute, as interpreted by this
9

The

Court

Court, is the supreme law to be
applied by all courts, Federal and
State. (Chesapeake & Ohio Rv. Co.
v. Kuhn, 284 U.S. 44, 46-67, 76
L.Ed. 157, 160, 52 S.Ct. 45 (1931).
B.

The term "employed'1

In an early interpretation, the Supreme Court expressed
its "opinion that Congress used the words 'employee' and 'employed7
in the statute in their natural sense, and intended to describe the
conventional relation of employer and employee."

Robinson v.

Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 237 U.S. 84, 94, 59 L.Ed 849, 853, 35
S.Ct. 491 (1915).
That conventional

relationship as

it bore upon the

questions of causal connection to employment was expanded upon by
the Court a few years later, referring to both English and American
cases:
"An accident arises out of the
employment where it results from a
risk incidental to the employment,
as distinguished from a risk common
to all mankind, although the risk
incidental to the employment may
include a risk common to all
mankind." . . .
"If it is the normal risk merely
which causes the accident, the
answer must be that the accident did
not arise out of the employment.
But if the position which the work
must
necessarily
occupy
in
connection with his work results in
excessive exposure to the common
risk, or if the continuity or
exceptional
amount
of exposure
aggravates the common risk, then it
is open to conclude that the
accident did not arise out of the
common
risk, but out of the
10

employment." . . .
The basis of these decisions is
that, under the specific facts of
each case, the employment itself
involved peculiar
and abnormal
exposure to a common peril, which
was annexed as a risk incident to
the employment. (Cudahy Packing Co.
v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 424-25,
68 L.Ed. 366, 370, 44 S.Ct. 153
(1923), citations omitted).
C.

The 1939 amendment

In 1939 the act was amended "to cure the evils of
hypertechnical distinctions which had developed in over 30 years of
FELA litigation which "were replete with very fine distinctions in
determining whether an employee was engaged in interstate commerce
within the contemplation of the act so as to entitle him to bring
suit for damages thereunder for injuries incurred while in the
carrier's employ•"

Southern Pac. Trans. Co. v. Gileo, 351 U.S.

493, 497, 498, 100 L.Ed. 1357, 1363, 1364, 76 S.Ct. 952 (1956).
That amendment added the second paragraph as codified at
45 U.S.C. section 51, so that the "employed/employee" status is now
clarified to cover "[a]ny employee . . ., any part of whose duties
. . . shall be the furtherance of interstate . . . commerce; or
shall, in any way directly or closely and substantially, affect
such commerce

. . . . "

See 45 U.S.C. § 51 (paragraph 2,

Determinative Statute, supra) . Act August 11, 1939, Ch. 685, § 1,
53 Stat. 1404.

In the view of the Supreme Court:

11

Although the amendment may have been
prompted by a specific desire to
obviate certain court-made rules
limiting coverage, the language used
goes
far
beyond
that
narrow
objective. It evinces a purpose to
expand coverage substantially as
well as to avoid narrow distinctions
in deciding coverage.
Under the
amendment, it is the "duties" of the
employee that must furnish or affect
commerce, and it is enough if "any
part" of those duties has the
requisite affect. . . .
"The word
' furtherance'
is a
comprehensive term. Its periphery
may be vague, but admittedly it is
both large and elastic." . . .
Similarly, those duties which "in
any way directly or closely and
substantially affect" interstate
commerce in the railroad industry
must necessarily be worked out
through the process of case-by-case
adjudication. This definition and
the "furtherance" definition of
employment in interstate commerce in
the 1939 amendment are set forth in
the
disjunctive.
In
some
situations, they may overlap. (Reed
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 351 U.S.
502, 506, 507, 100 L.Ed. 1366, 1374,
76 S.Ct 958 (1956).
The balance of this section of the brief will examine
that "case-by-case adjudication" and define the "periphery" in
situations which bear on and control the issue of plaintiff's
employment status at the time of the accident.
2.

Plaintiff was "employed" under the act prior to and at
the time of his injury.
A.
(1)

Plaintiff was "employed" while in his trailer.
The Cases
12

In Chicago H., St,P. & P. R.R. Co. v. Kane, 33 F.2d 866
(9th Cir. 1929) , plaintiff was an extra gang member living in
company quarters.

Prior to the breakfast hour preceding the

scheduled work day, he was killed while going from the bunk to the
toilet.

The court held that plaintiff was employed in interstate

commerce and covered by the act.

Although "he had not yet lifted

a pick or stuck a shovel into the ground . . . his employment was
definite, and the nature and place of his service for the day was
clearly understood."

Id. at 868. Of further significance is the

prescient comment of the dissent:
As I understand the majority
opinion, a railroad employee who
happens to sleep and take his meals
in a section house, bunk house, or
car furnished by the railway company
on its right of way is continuously
employed in interstate commerce,
even during the hours devoted to
sleep.
If this be true, a large
number of railway employees who make
their
houses,
temporarily
or
permanently, in quarters furnished
by railway companies on their rights
of way, are continuously employed in
interstate commerce, even though
their time of actual employment does
not exceed eight or ten hours per
day. (Id. at 870).
That this was indeed the law was demonstrated some years
later in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand.

In Mostyn v. Delaware

L. & W. R.R. Co.. 160 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1947), plaintiff was one of
a gang of track workers housed and fed in bunk cars.

Upon

returning to his bunk car after a day off and personal errands in
town, he opted to sleep outside because of the verminous condition
13

of his bunk.

He chose a poor place to sleep and lost a foot to a

passing railroad car.

The railroad argued that plaintiff was not

employed under the act when he went to town and that he did not
resume employment upon his return. In upholding the jury's verdict
for plaintiff, Judge Hand replied:
[A]lthough Mostyn was not "employed"
on Friday while he was in town, when
he came back that night to sleep he
was
as
much
and
as
little
"employed," as he would have been
had he been working during the day.
It seems to us that when a railroad
provides shelter or food or both for
its employees, and they are using
the accommodations so provided to
prepare themselves for their work,
or to rest and recuperate, they must
be regarded as in its "employ."
Unless that is true, we are driven
back to including only the very work
itself with the addition of going to
or away from it. . . .
[W]e hold
that, had Mostyn been sleeping in
one of the "bunk cars," he would
have been in the "employ" of the
railroad. (Id. at 17-18).
In another track employee case, Casso v. Pennsylvania
R.R. Co., 219 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1955), plaintiff was returning to
his bunk car living quarters after a day off in town. In upholding
a

verdict

for

plaintiff,

against

defendant's

argument

that

plaintiff was not back in his employment until he returned to the
bunk car, the court said:

14

We
do
not
think
that
the
ascertainment of when a man is under
the protection of the Act is to be
determined by any such mechanical
rule as the defendant contends.
This is no baseball game in which
the runner must touch base in order
to be safe. . . .
[T]he trial court was right in
telling the jury that this man, when
injured, was sufficiently in the
course of his employment to have the
benefit of the Act if his case
otherwise came within it. (Id. at
306) .
Among cases cited in support of the proposition, (id. at
306 n.2), was Atlantic Coastline R.R. v. Meeks, 30 Tenn.App 520,
208 S.W.2d 355 (1947), in which an employee, after spending a day
in town, returned to his bunk car and was injured by an exploding
oil tank.

The court held that he was in the scope of his

employment.
(2)

Factual Application

Thus in this case in which plaintiff was assigned to
living

quarters

owned

and maintained

by

defendant,

received

expenses and supplies from defendant, was subject to designation as
a camp tender and had responsibilities for his quarters (R. at 37072, Statement of the Facts, supra, para. 8), it cannot be doubted
that plaintiff was "employed" by defendant for purpose of the act
at and prior to the time when his foreman came to plaintiff7s
trailer prior to departure for the work site.

15

Plaintiff was "employed11 when injured enroute to
the work site

B.

(1)

The Cases Finding Coverage

In North Carolina R.R. Co. v. Zacharv, 232 U.S. 248, 58
L.Ed. 591, 34 S.Ct. 305 (1914), an important subsidiary issue was
whether the deceased plaintiff, killed on defendant's premises by
a passing engine, was on a personal errand, rather than on the
company's business, when he headed toward his off-premises boarding
house just prior to departing on his run.

To the court it was

"clear that the man was still 'on duty,' and employed in commerce"
at the time.

Id. at 260, 58 L.Ed, at 596.

The principle was shortly thereafter extended to an
employee killed on railroad premises by an engine at the close of
his work day.

The Court held:
In leaving the carrier's yard at the
close of his day's work, the
deceased was but discharging a duty
of his employment.
Like his trip
through the yard to his engine in
the morning, it was a necessary
incident of his day's work, and
partook of the character of that
work as a whole, for it was no more
an incident of one part than of
another.
(Erie R.R. Co. v.
Winfield, 244 U.S. 170, 173, 61
L.Ed. 1057, 1065, 37 S.Ct. 556
(1917), citation omitted.)

The rule was extended again in a case which arose under
the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act but which has been cited
repeatedly for its application to the Federal Employers' Liability
Act.

In that case, Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra,

Argument,

part

IB, plaintiff was killed

before reaching his

employer's

premises.

In upholding

the

award

to

decedent's

dependents, the Court said:
Here, the location of the plant
was at a place so situated so as to
make
the
customary
and
only
practical way of immediate ingress
and egress one of hazard. Parramore
could not, at the point of the
accident, select his way. He had no
other choice than to go over the
railway tracks in order to get to
his work; and he was in fact invited
by his employer to do so. . . .
The employment contemplated his
entry upon and departure from the
premises as much as it contemplated
his working there, and must include
a reasonable interval of time for
that purpose.
(Id., 263 U.S. at
426, 68 L.Ed, at 370).
Similarly, in another case arising out of the Utah act
which is also repeatedly cited for its persuasive impact on FELA
cases, Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158, 72 L.Ed.
507, 509, 48 S.Ct. 221 (1928), the Court stated:
[E]mployment includes not only the
actual doing of the work, but a
reasonable margin of time and space
necessary to be used in passing to
and from the place where the work is
to be done.
If the employee is
injured while passing, with the
express or implied consent of the
employer, to or from his work by a
way over the employer's premises,
. . . the injury is one arising out
of and in the course of employment
as much as though it had happened
while the employee was engaged in
his work at the place of its
performance.
In other words, the
employment may begin in point of
time before the work is entered upon
and in point of space before the
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place where the work to be done is
reached.
Application of these principles to the Federal Employers'
Liability Act has thereafter continued in the appellate courts.
Analysis of those cases makes it clear that in this case, plaintiff
Jose Ruiz was "employed" while enroute from his trailer to the work
site.
In Virginian Ry. Co. v. Early, 130 F.2d 548 (4th Cir.
1942) , plaintiff's decedent died from complications of an accident
which occurred on railroad property prior to starting work on his
return from a private lunchroom about one-fourth of a mile from the
shops in which he worked.

The defendant railroad requested a

directed verdict or at least a jury submission on the scope of
employment

issue.

The trial court rejected both requests and

decided the issue for plaintiff as a matter of law.

In upholding

that ruling the appellate court reviewed the applicable cases and
stated that:
[T]he scope of employment includes
not only actual services, but also
those things necessarily incident
thereto, such as going to and from
the place of employment on the
employer's premises. (Id. at 550).
The same year the issue was raised defensively in Lukon
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 131 F.2d 327 (3d Cir. 1942), a case
arising from the death of a railroad section hand walking along the
tracks from work toward his home. Despite the fact that there was
an available alternative route home along public roads, the court
18

was

"of the opinion that Lukon was clearly entitled

to the

protection of the act and that the contention of the defendant to
the contrary cannot be sustained.11

Id. at 329.

In support it

stated an often repeated theme:
The Federal Employers' Liability Act
was designed to be applied liberally
for the protection of railroad and
other employees. (Id. at 329).
The thrust of the cases to that point in time was
summarized in Sassaman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. . 144 F.2d 950, 952,
953 (3d Cir. 1944), as follows:
[I]t must be made to appear that his
injuries were sustained either upon
the premises where he normally
performed
the
duties
of
his
employment or upon premises so
closely adjacent thereto as to be a
part of the working premises in the
sense that the employee was required
to traverse them in going to or upon
leaving his work. In other words,
the employee's presence upon the
premises where he receives his
injuries must have been a necessary
incident to the discharge of the
duties of his employment. . . .
In short, the condition which
makes possible a claim for injuries
suffered as in the course of
employment, but which are actually
received on premises away from the
employee's place of employment is
the fact that the employee must, of
necessity,
traverse
such other
premises in order to reach or depart
from the place of the discharge of
his duties. In such circumstances,
he is upon the adjacent or other
premises, as a requisite of his
employment either with the knowledge
and consent or the approval of his
employer, at the least, legally
implied from the knowable situation.
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The issue reached a federal appellate court again in
Morris v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 187 F.2d 837 (2nd Cir. 1951), a
case in which an employee was killed by a railroad car 45 minutes
before he was to report for work manning a freight-handling
platform truck.

The employee had entered the yard at a forbidden

but commonly used entrance.

All entrances, however, required

passing over various railroad tracks.

Against the railroad's

"formalistic" argument that decedent was not in the course of his
employment when he was killed, the court responded:
It is now too late to argue that a
worker is within his employment only
when actually on the job . . . .
Here, where the decedent was killed
on the defendant's property only
shortly before he was to report for
work, there can be no doubt that he
was in the course of his employment
. . . . (Id. at 841).
In Carter v. Union R.R. Co., 438 F.2d 208 (3d

Cir.

1971), the principle was identified again and applied in favor of
a railroad employee injured on adjoining non-railroad premises
enroute from a parking area to his agreed starting point on those
premises. Although the railroad exercised no control over the path
where plaintiff was injured, the court noted that his use of the
property

"was

within

the

expectation

and

intentions

of

the

railroad" and held that "he was clearly within the course of his
employment."

Id at 210.

A state appellate court followed "the rule that the
Federal Employers7 Liability Act will be liberally construed by the
courts to effectuate its purpose of benefiting and protecting
20

railroad employees" in Temple v. Southern Pacific Trans. Co., 105
Cal.App.3d 988, 992, 164 Cal.Rptr. 780, 782 (1980).

In that case

plaintiff was injured in a private vehicle driven by his engineer
while enroute back to work from a layover point. The court applied
the overriding federal rule and the scope of employment principle
developed in the California state courts and held that the trial
court had erred in concluding that plaintiff was not acting in the
scope of his employment when injured.
Finally on point in this series of cases finding for
plaintiff

on

the

employment

status

issue

is

Caillouette

v.

Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal R.R. Co. . 705 F.2d 243 (7th Cir.
1983) .

There plaintiff had entered a switching yard from a

different than usual entrance, intending to call a switch engine to
the side where he was supposed to report to work.
before calling the engine.

He was injured

The railroad argued that he was still

in the process of commuting to work and thus outside the scope of
the Federal Employers' Liability Act.

In concluding that the case

came within FELA coverage, the court analyzed the commuter cases as
follows:
Commuters are excluded from coverage
for two reasons — they are not
required
to commute
on their
employer's
trains,
and,
while
commuting, they are in no greater
danger than any other member of the
commuting
public.
Employees
traversing the work site are covered
because this is a necessary incident
of the days work.
(Id. at 246,
citations omitted).
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(2)

The cases denying coverage

The principle that divide coverage from noncoverage is
best demonstrated by comparing the foregoing cases to those which
have denied coverage.

The following cases, spread from 1934 to

1981, show when and why FELA coverage is excluded.
In Young v. New York N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 74 F.2d 251 (2d
Cir. 1934), the plaintiff locomotive fireman was injured going to
his home in New Haven after completing his work. With his engineer
he had walked a mile on a public road, taken a public bus, and
"dead-headed" on one of defendant's trains before finally riding on
one of defendant's locomotives past the New Haven station to Cedar
Hill in order to pick up his street clothes. His election to ride
the locomotive to obtain his clothes from the Cedar Hill station
was his own choice instead of the alternative of continuing with
the engineer and taking a trolley home.
after a verdict

In ordering a new trial

for plaintiff, Judge Learned Hand

said that

plaintiff's desire to obtain his street clothes "was natural
enough, but it had nothing to do with his employment, and could
scarcely concern his relations with the defendant; he must arrange
for it on his own responsibility."
On retrial and

Id. at 253.

further appeal

from

a judgment

for

plaintiff, the court again reversed, noting that plaintiff "had
signed off at 6:45 p.m. and the accident happened at 9:00 p.m. His
duty to appellant had ended."

Young v. New York N.H. & N. R. R.

Co. . 79 F.2d 844, 845 (2d Cir. 1945).

"Since the ride to Cedar

Hill had no relation to interstate transportation, either past,
22

present, or future, the appellee fails to bring himself within the
prescribed provisions of the Federal Employers' Liability Act . .
• ." Id. at 846. In Sassaman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co. , supraf the
plaintiff train dispatcher, "after having discharged, for the day,
the duties of his employment" (id., 144 F.2d at 951), was injured
when alighting from one of defendant's passenger trains onto a
platform which was in a bad state of repair.

On appeal plaintiff

argued that "he was still upon the defendant's premises consequent
upon and incident to his taking leave of his place of employment to
return home . . . ."

Id. at 952.

The court disagreed.

Because after employment "he was

free to travel home or go elsewhere, as suited his desires, by
whatever means of transportation he chose [and] was not required to
travel on the defendant's train. . .[or] upon a particular train[,]
[t]here was absent . . . the employer compulsion as to the mode of
travel to and from work which serves to attach or continue the
employee relationship away from the place of employment, and makes
an interstate employee's right of recovery for injury remediable
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act."

Id. at 953.

In Quirk v. New York C. & St. L. R.R. Co., 189 F.2d 97
(7th Cir. 1951), plaintiff's decedent was a general foreman who,
after his gang had quit work for the day, left work at Muncie
without notifying his supervisor and was bound for home. He drove
a fellow employee's private automobile to Tipton and then used one
of defendant's motor cars.

He died in a collision with another

motor car.
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The court affirmed dismissal of the action holding that
"decedent's employment relationship ceased at the time he departed
from Muncie in a privately owned automobile. . . . When he left
Muncie, he was engaged solely in a personal activity unrelated to
his duties as an employee of the defendant."
the trip from Tipton toward home:

Id. at 100. As for

"It was only a continuation of

the same engagement, without any alteration of motive or purpose."
Id. at 101.
In Atchison. T. & S.F. R. R. Co. v. Wottle, 193 F.2d 628
(10th Cir. 1952), plaintiff's decedent, a section hand, and his
bunk mate left their bunk house by automobile an hour after
quitting time in order to obtain food and bedding, neither of which
was provided by the railroad.

Before reaching their destination

twelve miles away, both were killed by a train.
Noting that it was decedent's sole responsibility to
obtain the food and bedding, the court's majority concluded that:
"When, therefore, after his day's work, he set out in his own car
to obtain groceries for himself, he was on a mission wholly
unconnected and unrelated to his employment, and his injury while
thus engaged cannot be said to be in commerce within the meaning of
the Act."

Id. at 631.
In Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson. 265 F.2d 173 (5th

Cir. 1959), plaintiff, a freight train flagman, boarded one of
defendant's passenger trains to go from his home in Rhode Island to
join his freight train crew in Boston.

Plaintiff was injured

enroute as a result of a children's prank which shattered a window.
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In ruling against FELA coverage, the court noted that plaintiff was
not required to go to work on defendant's passenger train and could
have taken other routes, trains or means of transportation. Id. at
178.
Beyond that "plaintiff's employment as a flagman on a
freight train did not subject him to any peculiar or abnormal
danger while he was riding to work on one of his employer's
passenger trains.

On that train, he was exposed to no other or

greater hazard than any other passenger."

Id. at 178.

The court

refused "to extend the coverage of the Act to an employee who is
miles away from his job and only proceeding to it in a public
conveyance . . . ." * Id. at 178.
Finally, in this series of cases denying coverage, there
is Fowler v. Seaboard Coastline R.R. Co., 638 F.2d 17 (5th Cir.
1981).

There plaintiff, a railroad clerk, during work hours on an

enforced paid lunch break and on his employer's property, was
killed after being thrown from a motorcycle recently purchased by
another employee.

Decedent's duties did not require him to use a

motorcycle and the vehicle bore no relation to decedent's job as a
clerk.

Both the trial and appellate court found as a mater of law

"that the motorcycle excursion was a purely private activity
totally unrelated to the employment and denied recovery" under 45
U.S. C. section 51.
(3)

Id. at 20.
Factual application of the legal principles

This review of the cases has demonstrated that because
plaintiff's activity, while enroute to his work site was totally
25

related to his employment, he was "employed" under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act.

See Statement of the Facts, supra,

paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 23, and 24.
Plaintiff was not "on a personal errand" but was rather
"on the company's business" when he headed toward the work site.
See North Carolina R.R. Co. v. Zachary, supra.
He "was but discharging a duty of his employment"; "it
was a necessary incident of his day's work; and it partook of the
character of that work as a whole . . . ."

See Erie R.R. Co. v.

Winfield, supra.
The location of the work site "was at a place so situated
so as to make the customary and only practical way of immediate
ingress and egress one of hazard"; plaintiff "could not, at the
point of the accident, select his way"; "[h]e had no other choice
than to go over the railwayfs private gravel road] in order to get
to his work"; and "he was in fact invited by his employer to do
so."

See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, supra.
Plaintiff was "injured" while passing, with the express

or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way
over the employer's premises."

Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles,

supra.
"[T]he scope of employment

includes not only actual

services, but also those things necessarily incident thereto, such
as going to and from the place of employment on the employer's
premises."

Virginian Ry. Co. v. Early, supra.
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act was designed to be
26

applied

liberally

employees."

for

the protection

of

railroad

and

other

Lukon v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra.

Plaintiff's injuries were sustained "upon premises so
closely adjacent [to the premises where he normally performed the
duties of his employment] as to be a part of the working premises
in the sense that [he] was required to traverse them in going to
. . . his work."

See Sassaman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., supra.

Plaintiff was injured "on the defendant's property only
shortly before he was to report for work . . . ."

Morris v.

Pennsylvania R.R. Co.. supra.
Plaintiff's use of the road "was within the expectations
and intentions of the railroad . . . ." Carter v. Union R.R. Co..
supra.
"Employees traversing the work site are covered because
this is a necessary incident to the day's work."

Caillouette v.

Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal R.R. Co.. supra.
On the other hand, the cases denying FELA coverage,
clearly are inapposite.
Plaintiff's trip "had nothing to do with his employment";
"it had no relation to interstate commerce." See Young v. New York
N.H. & H. R.R. Co., supra., 74 F.2d at 253, 79 F.2d at 846.
Plaintiff "was free to travel home or go elsewhere, as
suited his desires . . . ."

Sassaman v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,

supra.

27

Plaintiff "was engaged solely in a personal activity
unrelated to his duties as an employee of the defendant." Quirk v.
New York C. & St. L. R.R. Co.. supra.
Plaintiff

"was on a mission wholly unconnected and

unrelated to his employment . . . ." Atchison. T. & S. F. R.R. Co.
v. Wottle. supra.
"Plaintiff's employment . . .did not subject him to any
peculiar or abnormal danger while he was riding to work . . . ."
Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson, supra.
Plaintiff's "excursion was a purely private activity
totally unrelated to the employment . . . ."

Fowler v. Seaboard

Coastline R.R. Co.. supra.
Thus the travel of plaintiff Jose Ruiz from his trailer
headquarters, where he was clearly covered under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, enroute to the work site was also a
covered activity. It most certainly was a covered activity once he
reached defendant's private gravel road which provided access to
the actual work site.
The next question is whether anything else even arguably
removes that coverage.
3.

It is that question to which we now turn.

The trial court erred in granting summary judgment to
defendant.
A.

The court's ruling

The trial court's primary basis for granting summary
judgment to defendant was the court's conclusion that plaintiff had
changed his "on-duty" location from Montello to Lakeside.
432, see Addendum, Ruling at 4).

(R. at

That conclusion was based on the
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court's finding relating to the permission given to plaintiff to
drive his own vehicle to Lakeside.
Ruling at 2-3, findings 4-6).

(R. at 430-31, See Addendum,
Because the court viewed the

agreement between plaintiff and his foreman as one which was made
"for personal reasons and having no causal relationship with his
employment" and because plaintiff would not be "under the control
and

supervision

of

the

defendant" while

driving,

the

court

concluded that plaintiff "was commuting from Montello to Lakeside
. . . ." (R. at 432-33, see Addendum, Ruling at 4-5).
The court recognized that the use of plaintiff's own
vehicle was "not controlling" but "pivotal" was the agreement that
plaintiff would "be on his own time" until he arrived at Lakeside.
Also persuasive to the court were the "other circumstances of not
being compensated and reimbursed expenses for the travel" and "of
using his personal vehicle for the trip . . . ."
was persuaded

that plaintiff

Thus the court

"was not in the course of his

employment but pursuing personal objectives."

(R. at 433, see

Addendum, Ruling at 5).
Although the court recognized that "it may be said that
plaintiff's driving of his car to Lakeside was done

in the

furtherance of defendant's business . . .it did so no more than any
commute . . . ."

The court's view was that plaintiff had not

"reported to work" in Montello; "he needed to be available for work
and under the supervision and control of the employer."
434, see Addendum, Ruling at 6).
B.

The court failed to utilize FELA principles
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(R. at

Most striking in the court's ruling is its total failure
to focus on the principles of the FELA cases defining the words
"employed" as used in the statute.

As a result, the court failed

to recognize the following:
(1) Plaintiff was "employed" under the statute even
while in his trailer before leaving on the drive to Lakeside.
(2)

Plaintiff remained

"employed" while on the

drive to Lakeside.
(3)

Plaintiff was most certainly "employed" when

driving on defendant's private gravel road enroute to the actual
place of work at Lakeside.
(4)

There

is

no

FELA

authority

for

removing

"employed" status pending "reporting for duty" or the report "to
work" of an employee living in a railroad work camp.
(5)

There

is

no

FELA

authority

for

removing

"employed" status because an employee uses his personal vehicle
enroute from a work camp to a work site.
(6)

There

is

no

FELA

authority

for

removing

"employed" status because an employee is willing to waive pay or
expenses•
(7)
"employed"

There

is

no

FELA

status because an employee

authority

for

removing

is not under the direct

control or supervision of his employee.
As a result of these failures, the court's conclusion
that plaintiff "was not in the course of his employment as a matter
of law" cannot stand.
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C. The court failed to recognize triable factual issues.
Although it is the view of plaintiff that, as a matter of
law he was "employed" at the time of his injury, it must be pointed
out that even under the trial court's view of material facts, there
were material factual issues in dispute.
plaintiff's

Those issues concern

"on-duty" point, the validity of any agreement

to

change that point and plaintiff's entitlement to pay.
In its findings and ruling, the court determined that
plaintiff's request to drive his own vehicle to the work site
constituted a request to report to work at Lakeside, Utah and,
therefore, change his "on-duty" location from its usual location at
Montello, Nevada.

That purported change in "on-duty" location, by

the court's analysis, converted the trip to the work site into a
"commute" during which plaintiff was "not in the course of his
employment."
In making these finding and ruling, the court ignored the
following evidence:
(1)

Under the collective bargaining

agreement,

employees' time starts at regular designated assembly points. (R.
at 352, 418).
(2) When an employee's living quarter is a trailer
furnished

by

the railroad,

the trailer

is established

employee's headquarters and designated assembly point.

as the

(R. at 353,

418) .

(3)

Plaintiff's foreman did not have authority to
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alter plaintiff's starting time.

(R. at 418).

(4) Plaintiff "assembled" at his headquarter point
at Montello, Nevada.

(R. at 418-19).

The court also found persuasive the fact that plaintiff
was not compensated by defendant for his travel time after leaving
the work camp enroute to the work site.

However, the preceding

evidence, also established that plaintiff was entitled to be
compensated for that time. In addition, there was other competent
evidence, relating to the pay issue, which was presented by the
general chairman of plaintiff's union, that under the collective
bargaining agreement, plaintiff was entitled to be compensated
starting at Montello on the day of his accident.

(R. at 417-19).

Thus, even if the FELA were ignored, as the trial court
did, and everything turned on plaintiff's "agreement" and on the
issue of pay, the trial court ignored evidence relating to the
validity and effect of the "agreement" as it related to both the
designated assembly point and plaintiff's entitlement to pay for
his time going to the work site.
On this analysis alone the court erred in concluding as
a matter of law that plaintiff was not in the scope of his
employment.
D.
Finally,

An agreement to waive FELA coverage is void

the purported

"agreement" between plaintiff

and his

foreman, as construed by the court would be void under provisions
of 45 U.S.C. section 55.

The reason the "agreement" is void is

because it fits within the statutory prohibition contained within
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the Federal Employers' Liability Act at 45 U.S.C. section 55, which
in relevant part provides that:
Any contract, rule, regulation, or
device whatsoever, the purpose or
intent of which shall be to enable
any common carrier to exempt itself
from any liability created by this
act, shall to that extent be void .
• • •

Section 55 has been interpreted to invalidate any company
rule, policy or individually bargained for agreement which in any
way limits or attempts to limit the carrier's liability under the
FELA.

See, e.g. , Thompson v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co,, 15 F.2d 28

(8th Cir. 1926)

(employee's agreement upon hiring).

In this

instance the "agreement" between plaintiff and his supervisor was
done to limit plaintiff's on-duty status and therefore, to limit
FELA liability as to an employee transporting himself between the
work camp and the

work site.

Thus the "agreement" is void under

Section 55.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Plaintiff has demonstrated that as a matter of law he was
"employed" and entitled to the benefits of the Federal Employers'
Liability Act at the time of his injury.
He has also demonstrated that even on the court's non-FELA
analysis, material triable issues of fact existed.
On either alternative, the trial court erred in concluding
that defendant was entitled to summary judgment.
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Plaintiff respectfully requests t/liis Court to reverse the
trial court and remand this matter for/iurthii/ proceedings.
Dated:

April 10, 1995

t
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r/d

%

Id S. Britt
torney for
laintiff/Appellant
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Tab A

§ 51. Liability of common carriers by railroad, in interstate or
foreign commerce, for injuries to employees from negligence; definition of employees
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between
any of the several States or Territories, or between any of the States and
Territories, or between the District of Columbia and any of the States or
Territories, or between the District of Columbia or any of the States or
Territories and any foreign nation or nations, shall be liable in damages to
any person suffering injury while he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce, or, in case of the death of such employee, to his or her personal
representative, for the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and
children of such employee; and, if none, then of such employee's parents;
and, if none, then of the next of kin dependent upon such employee, for
such injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of
any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of
any defect or insufficiency, due to its negligence, in its cars, engines,
appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other
equipment.
Any employee of a carrier, any part of whose duties as such employee shall
be the furtherance of interstate or foreign commerce; or shall, in any way
directly or closely and substantially, affect such commerce as above set
forth shall, for the purposes of this Act be considered as being employed
156

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY

45 USCS § 51

by such carrier in such commerce and shall be considered as entitled to the
benefit of this Act and of an Act entitled "An Act relating to the liability
of common carriers by railroad to their employees in certain cases
Approved April 22, 1908) [45 USCS §§ 51 et seq.] as the same has been or
may hereafter be amended.
(Apr. 22, 1908, ch 149, § 1, 35 Stat. 65; Aug. 11, 1939, ch 685, § 1, 53
Stat. 1404.)
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOSE RUIZ,

]
)
Plaintiff,

]

vs.

]

SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION,

])
]

Defendant.

RULING

Case No. 910900648

]

Both parties move for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether
plaintiff, a railroad employee, was within the scope of his employment when he was
injured. These motions are made in the context of the Federal Employers1 Liability Act.
The court grants defendant's motion for partial summary judgment. In doing
so, it finds the following facts, viewed most favorably to the plaintiff:
Findings
1. The plaintiff suffered serious injuries on May 18, 1990, as a result of a
one-car accident. His injuries left him mentally incompetent, and this court has appointed
a guardian and conservator for him.
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2. At the time of his accident, he was an employee of defendant, Southern
Pacific Transportation Company. He was also a permanent resident of Ogden, Utah, but
he temporarily resided at a workcamp in Montello, Nevada, to facilitate his dispatch to
worksites directed by the defendant.
3. Montello had been plaintiffs ordinary "on-duty" location since January
1990. As such, defendant paid him from the time he reported to work there each day, and
it also provided transportation for him and other employees to various worksites.
4. Prior to the accident, plaintiff sought permission to report to work at a
worksite in Lakeside, Utah, instead of at Montello, on Friday, May 18. He made this
request because he wanted to go home to Ogden the night before, and the drive back for
him was closer to the worksite than to Montello.
5.

His foreman, Andrew Gonzales, granted his request, subject to the

agreement, discussed on several occasions prior to May 18, that because he would not be
in company transportation and under company supervision, he would start and end his
work at Lakeside.

Accordingly, he would be on his own time and would not be

compensated for his travel time to Lakeside, for which he was normally paid overtime,
and, further, he would not be reimbursed for operating his private vehicle. He agreed
because his proposed arrangement would also allow him to leave directly from Lakeside
to Ogden and thus get home three hours sooner for the weekend. Gonzales made this
agreement based on his understanding of company policy.
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6.

Plaintiff subsequently changed his mind about going to Ogden on

Thursday night, probably because his crew worked late that day, and he stayed in
Montello. His decision to drive his personal vehicle to Lakeside the next morning and
to leave directly from Lakeside to Ogden did not change, however. About 5:00 a.m. the
morning of the accident, Gonzales knocked on plaintiffs trailer door to inquire if he
would becoming with the rest of the work crew who were in the gang truck; he declined.
Instead, the plaintiff, who was dressed for work but still fixing his lunch and not
assembling for work with the other crew members, said he would drive his own car and
join them in Lakeside, where the crew would fix railroad tracks.
7. Enroute from Montello to Lakeside, plaintiff rolled his vehicle on a road
owned by the defendant.

Defendant paid plaintiff no wage compensation or travel

expense for May 18, 1990.
Issues
In opposing defendant's motion, plaintiff presents two issues for
determination. First, are Gonzales1 declarations concerning plaintiffs statements regarding
his personal travel arrangements and his status at the time of the accident objectionable
hearsay under Rules 803 and 804, Utah Rules of Evidence? Second, was plaintiffs onduty location in Lakeside or Montello on May 18, 1993?
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A nalysis
Based on the facts presented, the court concludes and rules as follows:
Admissions Are Not Hearsay
By his legal position, plaintiff maintains that he was within the scope of his
employment at the time of his accident. His statements made to Gonzales prior to and
on May 18 controvert that position. Plaintiff seeks to exclude those statements under
Rules 803 and 804 on the basis that they are hearsay made inadmissible because plaintiff,
who is mentally incompetent, is unavailable as a witness at trial.
Plaintiffs status is more than a witness; he is a party. Consequently, the
subject statements, which are his own statements and are offered against him, are partyadmissions not hearsay. See Rule 801(d)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence. These statements
are, therefore, admissible. Furthermore, Rule 804, which is inapplicable in this case, is
an exception to the hearsay rule to allow, not exclude, the admission of hearsay statements
against interest if the declarant is "unavailable." It is a rule of necessity, having a
predicate of unavailability, to avoid the loss of critical evidence.
Plaintiff Changed His On-Dutv Location from Montello to Lakeside
Instead of reporting for duty at Montello with the other employees on the
morning of May 18, plaintiff remained in his trailer fixing his lunch. Under his prior
agreement with his foreman, Gonzales, he changed his on-duty location to Lakeside for
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personal reasons and having no causal relationship with his employment. By changing
his on-duty location and substituting company transportation for personal transportation,
he, unequivocally, was not under the control and supervision of the defendant when he
left Montello for Lakeside. In point, his employer could not supervise his conduct if he
chose to exceed the speed limit or to drive without a seat belt, and thus minimize its
exposure to liability. Unlike the other crew members who were in the gang truck and
under the direction of their foreman and, thus, were ready to perform work as directed,
plaintiff was subject to that direction only after he arrived in Lakeside. In short, he was
commuting from Montello to Lakeside in his own vehicle.
The mere use of his own vehicle is not controlling in the court's
determination.

Plainly, the law allows an employee to drive his own vehicle with

permission of the employer and still be in the course of his employment. Pivotal in the
court's ruling is the agreement between plaintiff and Gonzales to change plaintiffs on-duty
location to Lakeside and to be on his own time until he arrived there, thus making the
ride from Montello to Lakeside a commute.

The other circumstances of not being

compensated and reimbursed expenses for the travel between Montello and Lakeside and
of using his personal vehicle for the trip only further persuade the court that he was not
in the course of his employment but pursuing personal objectives.
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While it may be said that plaintiffs driving of his car to Lakeside was done
in the furtherance of the mission of defendant's business, because he was needed on the
job, and thus that act benefitted the business, it did so no more than any commute by an
employee to a business so that he can perform his duties. Likewise, plaintiffs mere
presence in the workcamp in Montello, away from his permanent residence in Ogden, did
not establish that he had reported to work; he needed to be available for work and under
the supervision and control of the employer.
The court concludes, therefore, that there is no issue as to any material fact
and that defendant was not in the course of his employment as a matter of law.
Defendant's counsel shall prepare, please, an appropriate order for the court's signature.
Dated this

II

day of January 1994.

MICHAEL D. LYON, Judg4
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JOSE RUIZ,
Plaintiff,
vs.

I*

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 910900648

SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, and
JOHN DOES I - X, inclusive,

Honorable Michael D. Lyon

Defendants.
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and
plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment came before
this Court for hearing on Thursday, December 9, 1993 at 11: 15
a. m.

The Honorable Michael D. Lyon presided.

represented by Donald Britt and Erik Ward.
represented by Bryon J. Benevento.

Plaintiff was

Defendants were

Based upon Defendants'

Motion for Summary Judgment, Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Affidavit of Andrew Stephen Gonzales, Plaintiff s
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, Plaintiff s Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, Defendants' Reply to Plaintiff s Memorandum in

Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment; and
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for
Summary Judgment, Plaintiff s Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Reply to Defendants' Motion to Plaintiff s
Motion for Summary Judgment, Declaration of Robert Douglas,
Defendants' Motion to Strike Affidavit of Robert Douglas,
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Robert Douglas, and oral argument
of counsel and for other good cause appearing thereon;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
facts presented by the parties, viewed most favorably to the
plaintiff, demonstrate that as a matter of law plaintiff was
not within the scope of his employment at the time he was
injured.

Therefore, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is

granted, and Plaintiff s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
denied.

The case is hereby dismissed.
DATED this

3S]

day of _

^fcf\^

, 1994.

BY THE COURT

Michael D. Lyon '
Second Judicial District Court Judge
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copy of the within and foregoing ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
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Donald S. Britt, Esq.
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906 "G" Street, Suite 500
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